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Abstract: 
This essay enlists Thomas Aquinas to enrich a late twentieth-century retrieval of the literal 
reading of biblical narrative in the Christian tradition. It argues that the Summa theologiae can be 
read so that the sensus litteralis, far from promoting one predeterminate meaning for a text, 
promotes instead a certain ordered diversity of readings, and that the evaluation of readings 
belongs largely elsewhere than in hermeneutics. It opposes both those who seek such a single 
meaning and those who propose that anything goes. In short, it is the office of hermeneutics to 
promote an ordered diversity, of ethics to evaluate the results, and of providence to control the 
outcome. Or in other words, hermeneutics belongs to what Thomas calls craft, and right 
interpretation to grace, working both within the interpreter and without. If right interpretation 
involves grace (or, more personally, the Holy Spirit), then within the interpreter one may speak 
of virtue, and outside the interpreter one may speak of providence. 
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Article: 
This essay enlists Thomas Aquinas to enrich a late twentieth-century retrieval of the literal 
reading of biblical narrative in the Christian tradition.1 It argues that the Summa theologiae can 
be read so that the sensus litteralis, far from promoting one predeterminate meaning for a text, 
pro-motes instead a certain ordered diversity of readings, and that the evaluation of readings 
belongs largely elsewhere than in hermeneutics.2 It opposes both those who seek such a single 
meaning and those who propose that anything goes. In short, it is the office of hermeneutics to 
promote an ordered diversity, of ethics to evaluate the results, and of providence to control the 
outcome. Or in other words, hermeneutics belongs to what Thomas calls craft, and right 
interpretation to grace, working both within the interpreter and without. If right interpretation 
involves grace (or, more personally, the Holy Spirit), then within the interpreter one may speak 
of virtue, and outside the interpreter one may speak of providence. 
Although the essay seeks Thomas's aid in addressing issues that he treats ex professo only in bits 
and in a very different context, nevertheless, several factors suit him eminently to contribute to 
the modern discussion, among them his commitment to a fourfold reading of scripture founded 
on the literal sense, his attention to the virtues, and his treatment of divine providence-not to 
mention his unique standing among the medievals not only for Catholics, but also for Protestants, 
Aristotelians, and Anglo-American ethicists after Alasdair MacIntyre. 
I. AN INTERPRETER'S LICENSE  
Thomas's official statement in the Summa comes at 1.1.10. (All quotations from him in this 
section originate there.)3 It may seem at first glance to wed him to the author's intention as a 
control on the possible senses of a text that would presume to eliminate some readings a priori. 
For the spiritual sense with its subdivisions "is based on and presupposes [fundatur et supponit] 
the literal sense," and "the literal sense is that which the author intends." But so simple a reading 
sets up an opponent of straw. It turns out that Thomas's reflection on the literal sense leaves 
matters surprisingly underdetermined and that the author's intention functions in his hands more 
to promote diversity than to contain it. Consider the text:  
That God is the author of holy Scripture should be acknowledged, and God has the power, not 
only of adapting words to convey meanings (which a human being also can do), but also of 
adapting the things themselves [ut non solum voces ad significandumac comodet... sed etiamr esi 
psas].I n every branch of knowledge words have meaning [vocess ignificent], but what is special 
here is that the things meant by the words also themselves mean something. That first meaning 
whereby the words signify things belongs to the sense [sensus] first mentioned, namely the 
historical or literal. That meaning, however, whereby the things signified by the words in their 
turn also signify other situations is called the spiritual sense, and it is based on and presupposes 
the literal sense.  
... Now because the literal sense is that which the author intends, and the author of holy Scripture 
is God who comprehends everything all at once in God's understanding, it comes not amiss 
[none st inconveniens]as St. Augustine says in Confessions XII, if many meanings [pluress 
ensus]a represent even in the literal sense of one passage of Scripture.4 
From the article as a whole we can pick out three distinguishable senses of "literal." They admit 
of distinction, but they do not command it; Thomas expects them generally and for the most part 
to fall together, and if he articulated the distinctions that I am going to make he would probably 
flag them as "quoad nos." We may call them intentional, narrative, and communal.  
1. It is the intentional sense that functions in the body of the article and makes the argument run. 
"The literal sense is that which the author intends," Thomas writes, "and the author of holy 
Scripture is God." Note that no modern inspiration theory plays any part here; God counts as 
author primarily of states of affairs. Human authors like human agents generally always act as 
free secondary causes. Otto Pesch even finds it congenial to argue that the Middle Ages 
possessed the presuppositions to open a door to historical-critical exegesis and indeed that 
Thomas of-fered more of the backing that historical criticism would require than anyone before 
him.5  
2. In the body of the article and in his answer to the second objection Thomas has recourse to a 
potentially second, distinct sense of "literal." He calls it "historical," and in the phrase "litteralisv 
el historicus" he makes the two frequent yokefellows. He glosses it with Augustine as occurring 
"whenever any matter is straightforwardly recorded-"cum aliquid simpli-citerp roponitur."Note 
that Thomas adverts only to the manner of the re-cording, if you will, to the record's genre, and 
not to its reference. "Cum aliquid simpliciterp roponitur" is quite different from was eigentlichg 
eschehen ist. It is not here but under the relation of divine and human causality that Thomas may 
hold the door open to historical criticism. Evidence that the literal sense covers more than 
"history" currently does comes when Thomas treats parables. Therefore it seems helpful to 
describe the literal sense as "narrative." It captures Thomas's own "cum aliquid simplici-terp 
roponitur. "6  
3. Thomas uses "literal" in a potentially third way when he answers the article's first objection. 
Someone has objected that multiple senses in scripture would set up confusion. Thomas makes 
three points: Only the literal sense can found argument, only it can support the spiritual senses, 
and it therefore occasions no confusion. In order for those claims to stand, Thomas must have 
some notion like this in mind: The literal sense functions de facto as that which commands 
agreement. But not in a static way, since it is the same agreement that founds the spiritual senses' 
diver-sity.7 Two interlocking functions arise from the way that literal and spiri-tual senses relate: 
as that which commands agreement the literal sense serves stability; as that which founds and 
supports the spiritual senses it promotes the diversity that it is a purpose of this essay to explore. 
It is the requirement of commanding general agreement that leads me to call the third use 
"communal."8  
Here as elsewhere my analysis diverges from that of James Samuel Preus's excellent book From 
Shadow to Promise.9 Preus argues that it is through Thomas that, by the time of the Reformation, 
the literal sense becomes the captive rather than the teacher of the hierarchy. The turn to the 
church offers one way-namely, Cajetan's10-of filling the gaps that an underdetermining 
hermeneutics opens up, to which I shall be offering an alternative. Against a view such as Preus's 
one may point to the extent of the community Thomas appeals to. (Recall that it is agreement 
only on the literal sense that he needs; disagreement on the spiritual senses comes as no 
surprise.) So it is that when Thomas comes to expound the literal sense of the Old Law he always 
turns to what the Jews do, and it is from Maimonides that he has learned much of what he says. 
Thomas evidently has quite a wide body of agreement in mind-one that extends beyond the 
hierarchy at least as far as Jews and probably beyond. One wonders whether it might not be 
possible, on analogy with the natural knowledge of God's existence and the natural knowledge of 
God's law to characterize the literal sense as the "natural knowledge" of God's Word. Under 
those circumstances it is hard to imagine how Thomas could, in the literal sense, exclude the 
readings of Protestants, so that if Thomas's article on the senses of scripture had controlled 
Catholic thinking at the time of the Reformation, and not Cajetan's commentary on it, the 
disputes could not, as Pesch points out, have run the way they did.11 
After all is said and done, Thomas's purely methodological considerations seem to exclude only 
conflict with the literal sense. Conflict with God's intention, as we shall explore in more detail, 
will prove hard to establish. Thomas says little to raise the question of human access to it. And 
conflict about what to read as the literal sense will prove hard to resolve. Furthermore, some 
literal senses are metaphorical, the third re-ply says, as when scripture speaks of God's arm, so 
that figuration does not confine itself to the spiritual level. Even figurative senses may qualify as 
literal-that is, intentional-in the mind of God.12 All that leaves a great many questions 
unanswered, and a great deal in hermeneutics underdetermined. Contrary to expectation, 
therefore, method carries readers almost no distance at all toward evaluating interpretations. 
More help comes elsewhere. 
II. A SAMPLE OF FIGURATIVE EXEGESIS 
In this section I consider a sample of Thomas's exegesis, a figurative reading of sacrificial 
ceremonies described in Numbers 19. It will show three things: (a) How it calls out, from a 
modern point of view, for critical evaluation, for much of it will strike modern readers as 
offensive. (b) How it, especially as inherited from the tradition and hence nearer the center than 
the margin of Thomas's practice, shows off a great open-ness to or range among figurative 
meanings, literal in the mind of God. (c) How, like the natural knowledge of God and the natural 
law, Thomas's hermeneutical theory follows and validates scripture-in this case Hebrews 13.13 
A figurative reason for this sacrifice is that the red cow signified Christ in the lowly condition he 
took on himself, this being denoted by the sex of the animal, and its colour signified the blood of 
Christ's passion. The cow was of fullage, because all the works of Christ are perfect; it had no 
blemish, nor had it ever born the yoke, for Christ did not bear the yoke of sin. It was commanded 
to be brought to Moses, because to it was imputed the transgression of the Mosaic Law in the 
breach of the Sabbath. It was also commanded to be delivered over to Eleazer the priest, because 
Christ was delivered into the hands of the priests to be put to death. It was sacrificed outside the 
camp, because Christ suffered out-side the gate [Heb. 13:12]. The priest dipped his finger in the 
blood, because, by discernment, which the finger signifies, the mystery of Christ's passion is to 
be reflected and imitated. It was sprinkled over against the tabernacle, which de-noted the 
synagogue, either in condemnation of the unbelieving Jews, or to indi-cate the purification of 
believers. This was done seven times, either in token of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, or of 
the seven days in which all time is comprised. [1-11.102.5 ad 3] 
a) Some objections. This will probably strike many modern readers as "having gone too far." 
That any determinate meaning should attach to the number seven seems to ignore the variety of 
contexts in which it ap-pears: it might as well stand for the seven openings in the head. That the 
color of the heifer should signify Christ's passion recalls an accusation that gets used to dismiss 
all medieval exegesis: anything red stands for Christ's passion. That a finger dipped in blood 
should signify the finger of discernment seems to ignore that in the first case it would point down 
and in the second up. That the sprinkling of the blood should condemn the Jews sounds anti-
Semitic. And that the heifer's sex should symbolize Christ's lowly estate sounds (to use an 
anachronistic category) sexist.  
b) On the other hand Thomas's method will give us no purchase against such readings. Nor 
should it. Any norms fine enough to exclude standard medieval procedures would end up also 
excluding many cur-rent procedures that it would impoverish modern interpreters to give up. 
Does it import a category any more foreign to the text for Thomas to see Christ's blood in 
something red than for a Freudian to see a phallus in something long? Is it any less arbitrary for 
Thomas to pair off seven sprinklings of blood with the seven gifts of the Spirit than for a 
structural-ist to pair off first and last, second and penultimate words of a text until she reaches its 
center? The Freudian and the structuralist could, like Thomas, each produce enough 
hermeneutics after the fact to defend the moves. How better could feminists defend the 
application of female im-ages to the second person incarnate than by invoking typology to argue 
that Numbers and Hebrews have, in the red heifer, given them authority and precedent? Or how 
better to counter nineteenth-century slavemasters' and contemporary bigots' appeals to the curse 
of Ham than to preach from verses in Revelation that describe the bronze skin and woolly hair of 
the last Judge?14 
c) Thomas's interpretation goes only somewhat further than Hebrews. Any method that excluded 
some details a priori would run the risk of outlawing the biblical example. Therefore we may 
regard this as a positive function and purpose of Thomas's hermeneutics: that it make room for 
exegesis like that in Hebrews and reflect on it after the fact-that it make room, in fact, for the use 
of the Hebrew Scriptures by the New Testament authors. It is not, after all, as if Thomas had 
worked out a general hermeneutics before he had any samples of successful exegesis. 
III. AN ORDERED DIVERSITY: FITTING EXPLICATIONS AND SPIRITUAL SENSES  
Thomas heads the sample of exegesis we have been considering with the rubric "conveniens 
ratio," a fitting explication or suitable reason.15 Arguments from convenientia befit the realm of 
contingency rather than necessity. Perhaps a consistent use of sensus spiritualis in the theory and 
conveniens ratio in the example marks the usual gap between the divine and the human, the 
objective and the intersubjective. The sensus spiritualis is at home in God's mind, to which 
human beings in this life ordinarily lack access; the conveniens ratio underlines a theologian's 
humility before that lack-by contrast with a ratio necessaria, at home in a domain where hu-man 
minds (still fallible) may actually possess the principles from which they reason.16 Signal 
evidence for the distinction may be that convenientes rationes appear most prominently and 
elaborately when Thomas is explicating the mysteries of God's action in salvation history, 
especially the gracious contingencies in the commandments of the Torah and the life of Christ."  
If I am right, what I have called "the usual gap" works to preserve an apophatic moment in 
Thomas and to name human ignorance, like this: In the five ways Thomas reaches conclusions 
about "what everyone calls God" (1.2.3). They conclude, that is, not with the apodictically 
indisputable but with what no one in fact disputes. Similarly on the natural knowledge of God's 
law Thomas appeals not directly to the eternal law beyond our grasp but to what "is the same for 
most people" (I-II.94.4). Again, he expects to prevent confusion by reference to the literal sense. 
At the same time human beings remain importantly blind to the realities to which they refer: the 
divine essence, the divine law, and the divine inten-tion lie in this life beyond human sight. 
Thomas's purpose in marking the gap is not to undermine the five ways or the natural law or the 
literal sense by contrast to something more objective, but to license appeal to what most people 
agree on by contrast to that to which human beings lack access. The five ways, the natural law, 
and the literal sense help ex-plain why Thomas saw a good deal of commonality, even 
transcultural commonality in interpretation, but human knowledge of the literal sense lacks the 
character that would enable it to settle disputes apodictically.18  
So if a tendency to distinguish conveniens ratio from a spiritual sense objective to God but 
beyond human access furthers that distinction, then one might expect appeals to convenientia to 
pick out a communally agreed-on spiritual sense, while appeals to a sensus spiritualis pick out 
the sense intended by God using states of affairs to speak but to which human beings ordinarily 
lack any direct access. Thus Thomas would use conve-nientia positively, to commend the sense 
of the believing community in interpretation, as "what everyone calls God" commends in natural 
theology, "what is the same for most people" commends it in the theory of the natural law, and 
the literal sense as that which prevents confusion commends in a theory of the natural knowledge 
of God's Word. Thus the sensus as intended by God using things to speak, whether literal or 
figurative, provides a theological (rather than general hermeneutical) warrant for a ratio ex 
convenientia, a de jure answer to the question of why the community proves reluctant to give up 
a particular entrenched reading-as, for instance, when one part of the scriptures offers it for 
another part, just as eternal law provides a theological (rather than meta-ethical) answer to the 
question, Why natural law? and "God" tenders a theological answer to the question, What prime 
mover?19  
In rare cases the appeal to the literal sense as God's intention will work to privilege some 
figurative readings, namely, when they show up as the literal sense of some other passage. In 
most cases, however, the label literal or God's intended sense will (because states of affairs may 
signify other states of affairs indefinitely) become a whole category into which many readings 
may fall. Thomas insists on that point when he writes, as we saw above, that "it comes not amiss 
[non est inconveniens] if many meanings are present even in the literal sense." As a whole 
category the appeal to author's intention promotes diversity rather than restriction of readings, 
particularly since we can point so rarely to relatively independent indications of what it is. 
It will seem less strange that the author's intentions should function that way if one considers a 
similar change in "intention" after Freud. Without psychoanalytic theory the notion of 
"subconscious intention" sounds like a contradiction in terms. Yet post-Freudians have become 
so familiar with it that it gives them no second thought. So, too, Thomas's readers with multiple 
divine intention. A post-Freudian author with sub-conscious intentions may escape our grasp 
better than a pre-Freudian one without, just as a divine author resists human control better than a 
mortal one. One author's subconscious may arrange words to stand for states of affairs that stand 
for further, psychologically explicable states of affairs that the author may not acknowledge or 
may even disavow, just as another author's God may arrange divine words to stand for states of 
affairs that stand for other, christologically explicable states of affairs that the author, ante 
Christum natum, might want to disavow.20 So, in both cases the author's intention serves to 
expand rather than narrow the range of readings. Finally, parts of psychoanalytic theory distant 
from textual interpretation, such as the stages of sexual development, will tend to privilege some 
readings, just as parts of theology distant from hermeneutics, such as doctrines of the atonement, 
will tend to privilege some exegeses. But such theoretical contexts relate so distantly to official 
method as to constitute distinct interests and purposes.  
In a moment I will go on to talk about how Thomas evaluates the interests and purposes of the 
interpreter. But first it is time to reexamine the first objection that Thomas poses to his own 
view. Is it not the case that the existence of multiple senses sub una littera takes away the 
"firmness of argument" (I.1.10 obj. 1)-especially if the multiplicity is that not merely of the 
spiritual senses, but that of the literal sense itself, as a class of meanings? The answer to the first 
objection assumes that Thomas directs it only against the possibility of spiritual senses. "The 
multiplicity of these senses does not make for equivocation," because it is the states of affairs 
rather than the words that support the spiritual senses. Firmness of argument is maintained, the 
reply continues, because in case of dispute, argument may proceed on the basis of the literal 
sense alone. The answer to the first objection appeals to the literal sense: it does not contemplate 
the possibility of the literal sense taking the firmness of argument away. That question remains 
unanswered: Granted that firmness of argument is maintained once the literal sense has been 
established, how is firmness of argument maintained in establishing the literal sense in the first 
place? Or, in other words: Suppose there is a dispute about the literal sense itself?  
There are several answers. One is that Thomas is not a modern thinker and is not imagining 
"firmness of argument" with the architecture of a building in mind, where something would 
stand as a foundation. Earlier in the same question Thomas considers the scientific character of 
the discipline of theology using personal rather than architectonic metaphors-or better, it is the 
architect he mentions rather than the building. The student of sacred doctrine uses manuductions 
as an architect uses a con-tractor or the civil authority the military (I. 1.5 ad 2). The use of 
inferiors by superiors in this way involves firmness not of the materials but of character, or the 
virtue of prudence, to which I will shortly come. So too the determination of the literal sense 
requires firmness of argument, "arguendi firmitatem," where "argument" is literally the human 
act of arguing, rather than a syllogism on a page. Arguing is more a matter of rhetoric, or art, 
than hermeneutics, or technique. Elsewhere, Thomas goes so far as to require that the literal 
sense bear more than one reading in order to preserve the possibility of arguing with opponents-
he requires that the literal sense form a class of reading precisely to sustain the firmness of 
argument. To do otherwise might expose the arguments of the faith to the opposite of firmness: 
ridicule.21 
 For in the De potentia (q.4, a. I, c., post init.) Thomas writes, following Augustine, that one 
should avoid subjecting the truth of the faith to ridicule (ab infidelibus veritasfidei irridetur) by 
holding that something belongs to the faith that has been shown to be false. (The case in question 
is Aristotelian and biblical views of creation.) Since it is also to be avoided that anyone should 
claim that scripture teaches something false, the "give" must come in interpretation. Thus it is 
also to be avoided  
that anyone confine [cogere] scriptures o to one sense, that other senses be entirely excluded, 
that in themselves contain truth and are able to be adapted to scripture, preserving the way the 
words run [salval itteraec ircumstantia];for this pertains to the dignity of divine scripture, that it 
contain many senses under one letter, in order that it may both in that way befit diverse intellects 
of human beings-that all may marvel that they are able to find in divine scripture the truth that 
they conceived by their minds-and by this also defend more easily against the infidels, since if 
anything which someone wants to understand out of sacred scripture appears to be false, recourse 
is possible to another of its [literal!] senses.... Whence all truth [omnisv eritas] which, preserving 
the way the words run, can be adapted [potest adaptari] to divine scripture, is its sense [or, "is a 
sense of it"].22  
Does this mean that anything goes for the literal sense? By no means. Does Thomas provide a 
procedure that the Enlightenment would recognize as a method for adjudicating these difficult 
cases? No. But the marshaling of scientific and literary evidence for interpretation does require 
the virtue of prudence, about which Thomas has much to say. 
IV.T HEOLOGICAL INT ERESTS AND PURPOSES 
 It should come as no surprise when specific samples of exegesis also reflect relatively distant 
theological interests and purposes. Any rabbi could point out the distance between precritical 
Jewish and Christian exegesis of the common scriptures. Nor would it take Mary Daly to point 
out that Thomas's method need not make a cow's sex the symbol of Christ's lowly estate. It 
simply follows that when hermeneutics leaves interpretation underdetermined, as Thomas's 
wisely does and as any interesting hermeneutics must, other-Thomas would say, contingent-
interests and purposes take over. In his case it is precisely the relevant theological interests and 
purposes-like making Christian sense of Numbers, validating He-brews, unifying the two 
Testaments, elaborating the atonement-that render a reading conveniens. It is convenientia that 
allows Thomas to attribute reasoning from effect to cause to the second person of the Trinity and 
convenientia that leads him to associate the second person with the eternal law. Figurative 
readings most apt to remain inconveniens will also refer to Christ. At the end I will say more 
about how a theological commitment to providence constitutes one of the most pervasive of 
those interests apparently distant from hermeneutics.  
Thus Thomas would appreciate if he did not inspire Jeffrey Stout's comments on method:  
method (bad sense)-a self-sufficients et of rules for performings ome task; ... see hermeneutics 
(bad sense); perfectly captured in this sentence from Camus: "Quando n n'ap as de caractdre,ilf 
aut biens e donneru nem ithode."  
method(innocuous sense)-rules of thumb for performing some task; not a substitute for phronesis 
and tact.23 
V. AN INTERPRETER'S VIRTUES  
The reference to phronesis, prudence, points us in an important direction, to the role that the will 
plays in interpretation and the leverage that its role might provide for evaluation. For 
interpretation is a human act. Therefore Thomas might well evaluate it as he evaluates other 
human acts. The state of the will plays a crucial role in Thomas's evaluation of the act of faith 
and in the act of fulfilling the natural law. That he fails to advert to it, as far as I know, in the 
case of interpretation, can therefore have nothing to do with a concern for consistency. Rather 
the reverse. Consistency and, if we follow other examples, even adequacy would demand it. Nor 
can his reluctance have anything to do with a lack of re-sources. For whatever reason, Thomas 
tended largely to neglect the virtue language where evaluation finds itself most at home. Current 
readers, however, may deploy it. 
Thomas prescribes evaluation of both the exterior and interior aspects of a human act, giving to 
the interior act absolute priority. The product he evaluates according to art, and the agent 
according to virtue: charity (1-11.57.1), justice (1-11.57.3 ad 2), prudence (I-II.57.4).24 In detail: 
The theoretical knowledge or method regards only the true and false (1-11.57.2 ad 3). The 
hermeneutics of I.1.10 stands first of all under that description. Art, techne, or skill about things 
to be made, counts as an intellectual virtue-virtue because it specifies the good of a product-but 
not a moral one. As the mere exerciser of skill, even the artisan, almost as skill's instrument or a 
product's mere sufficient cause, can get evaluated in technical terms: "So long as a geometrician 
demon-strates truth, it does not matter how he or she feels about it, whether joyful or angry; 
neither ... is it relevant to the artisan as artisan .... Art gives only the ability to act well" (1-
11.57.3). 
For the actuality of acting well, however, an agent needs moral virtue. Take as a striking 
example the case of "the demons [who] believe and tremble" (11-11.5.3, esp. ad 1 and 3). It 
marks the demons to command a keener intelligence and an abler skill than we do. The evidence 
of signs compels them to confess Jesus as Lord quite apart from a movement of their wills-as it 
cannot compel human beings. Thus the demons who believe and tremble complete, despite 
themselves, the exterior act of faith. But they use the knowledge ill, detesting rather than loving 
it. And the interior act, their greater art all unavailing, vitiates their knowledge. It is thus, for 
Thomas, that "the demons believe and tremble," and thus that faith as a product of an intellectual 
process comes to count for them as something bad, something that redounds to their discredit. So 
too for the use of art-of which Thomas specifies that "constructing ... a pas-sage of prose" (1-
11.57.3 ad 3) constitutes an instance-"In order that one may make good use of art, one needs a 
good will, which is perfected by moral virtue" (1-11.57.3 ad 2). Elsewhere, Thomas does not 
hesitate to turn from evaluation of the product, such as a piece of knowledge or an act in 
accordance with natural law, to the evaluation of its status in the agent's will-he insists on it. 
Why not then here? He goes on: "For this reason Aristotle says that there is a virtue for art, 
namely, a moral virtue, inasmuch as good use of art requires a moral virtue. Clearly it is through 
justice, which gives aright will, that an artisan is set on doing faithful work" (ibid.). 
When Thomas turns his attention to the use of an art he takes the skill as a means, the product as 
a tool toward some end like justice. It is the employment of an interpretation that now needs 
attention. In an important case, of course, the first use of an interpretation comes by the 
interpretation's author. For no one interprets without a mind to use; every interpretation befits 
some purpose. Indeed, for Thomas acts do not occur or make complete sense except in reference 
to end. When the analysis also of an interior act applies to interpretation and its use, evaluation 
according to art is by no means left behind, but new criteria open up that Thomas makes richer 
and more nuanced. His comments on the art of interpretation occupy a single article; to it one 
may add a few articles on the intellectual virtues. Those on the moral with the theological 
virtues, on the other hand, run for hundreds of pages.  
If readers instruct their interests along Thomas's lines then they will attend not only to an 
interpretation's truth but also to its goodness, not only to its art and skill but also to its use and 
fruit. That also makes sense in terms of Thomas's own interests and purposes. For it looks as if it 
falls to method, by purpose and function, to promote diversity; to evaluate the products and 
choose among them, on the other hand, falls to ethical reflection. 
Of course it is not in this life simply and identically the same to display the virtues of an art and 
to count the artist among the virtuous. One can make a rough-and-ready, penultimate distinction 
between them. This is not the place to rehearse Thomas's arguments for the virtues' unity. But the 
rough-and-ready distinction does break down. The courageous Nazi,25 in a standard example, 
simulates courage well enough for an observer provisionally to call it that but proves finally to 
mistake true courage for foolhardiness. The infidel-killing crusader, in another, "Christ is Lord" 
his battle cry, utters a homophone for something true of Christ, but betrays a notion of lordship 
altogether at odds with what a true inter pretation of that predicate would require.26 The Nazi 
counterfeits courage, and the crusader belies his faith. 
 
Another way of stating the thesis is that hermeneutics requires wisdom. Thomas elsewhere 
confirms and qualifies the claim. At 1.1.6 he asks whether sacred teaching in general counts as 
wisdom. Not only does hermeneutics fall under sacred teaching, but, as sacred scripture is the 
instrumental cause of sacred doctrine, it helps to constitute it.27 Our first look at how 
hermeneutics requires wisdom confined itself to a thoroughly Aristotelian move without clear 
Christian commitments. Here, however, we find that radically theological claims of a sort 
Aristotle would hardly recognize lying just below the surface. Thomas writes, "That person ... 
who considers simply the highest cause of the entire universe, namely God, is to be called 
supremely wise." Obviously, Thomas calls on the interpreter of the Bible to exhibit such wisdom 
by considering how God uses states of affairs to speak. In fact, so deeply do Thomas's 
theological interests and purposes there ramify through the article on scripture's multiple senses 
that a modern reader might well read it as belonging more properly to a meditation on 
providence than to one on method. As Thomas specifies in the Quodlibetal Questions, "Things 
are so ordered in their course that such a [spiritual] sense can be taken from them only [by] the 
one who governs things by providence, who is God alone" (Quod. 7.6.3c). And Thomas defines 
providence as the prudence of God (1.22.1). In interpretation the prudence of the interpreter 
attempts to reflect the prudence of God in arranging states of affairs to speak. It is, on Thomas's 
account, highly appropriate to expect the interpreter's interests and purposes to deepen and 
inform the interpretation, since, as Victor Preller puts it, "conformation of the mind to the 
intention of sacred scripture effects the conformation of the soul to the Second Person of the 
Trinity." 28 It is also appropriate therefore to attend to those interests and purposes and to ask 
about their christoformity.  
Thomas's position also respects the contributions of interpreters lacking, like all human beings, 
perfect wisdom or justice or charity. It is not the case that a turn to the interpreter will by a 
species of Donatism render the histories of Emmanuel Hirsch inaccurate or subject the theology 
of Paul Tillich to dismissal. Nor will it plead specially for the pious ruminations of the beautiful 
soul. The reply to the third objection in the article on wisdom specifies as well the situation of 
the interpreter: 
There are two kinds of wisdom. ... Persons who possess the habit of a virtue rightly commit 
themselves to what should be done in consonance with it, because they are already in sympathy 
with it; hence Aristotle remarks that it is the virtuous person who sets the measure and standard 
for human acts. Alternatively,... per-sons soundly instructed in moral science can appreciate the 
activity of virtues they do not themselves possess.  
The first way of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom which is classed among the Gifts 
of the Holy Ghost.... The second way of judging is taken by sacred doctrine to the extent that it 
can be gained by study.  
The passage offers two qualifications. First, it remains appropriate to find an interpretation or its 
application lacking in justice or charity even when readers appreciate those qualities more than 
they possess them. Justice and charity provide some of the categories that permit an approach to 
truth, that allow, in this case, the adequation of mind to text.29 Second, study remains of help. 
Both the ethical categories that Christian interpreters may want to bring to bear, and the 
hermeneutical skills that virtue and tradition have found helpful, will number among study's 
appropriate ends.  
Suppose we return to Thomas's interpretation of Numbers and begin to treat it in the way I have 
suggested. At least two advantages accrue thereby. First, Christian interpreters will equip 
themselves better to do justice to the misgivings I sketched above. They will also give Thomas 
something more Thomistic to do with a reading that, like many others, he largely inherited. They 
will be able, for example, to defend the intu-ition that reading red as Christ's passion simply goes 
too far, the product of a runaway interpreter's appetite, the desire to interpret every detail: one 
needs the virtue of temperance to restrain it.30 Then they will be able, in a clearer case, to object 
to Thomas's use of the equation of the cow's sex with Christ's estate; he might more justly or 
hopefully have used it to say that estate of Christ elevated the sex of the cow. Then they will be 
able to help Thomas decide whether the sprinkling of blood against the tabernacle condemns the 
Jews or purifies the believers.31 Of course the change of ground will not end the debate but it 
may enrich it. For then Christian interpreters will also be arguing about how they, as authors and 
employers of texts, as well as how texts, as mines for typology, conform to Christ. 
VI. BETWEEN PROVIDENCE AND PRAYER  
Those who worry about the use and abuse of texts, who fear that a glance at the interpreter gives 
the text "a wax nose," also tend if they follow the Enlightenment to address their worries in 
hermeneutics. How else, in other words, is the biblical text to offer resistance to interpreters' 
prejudices and preconceptions? Three points:  
a) Thomas wastes little worry on "what the text says" as such. His hermeneutics devotes its two 
scant pages to pointing us elsewhere. Thomas worries less about what the text says, that is, than 
what God says through it. Even so, God speaks through it only secondarily, as the interpreter, or 
any human agent seeking to influence events works secondarily, since God's primary agency in 
revelation works through states of affairs, just as in general God's primary agency oversees all 
states of affairs in the world. So it is God and not the text-or God working through and with the 
text-that offers resistance.  
b) It is certainly not the case that the Bible is for Thomas to leave interpreters' preconceptions 
unchanged. Neither, however, can it change them, in the absence of God's work in the will. If 
there were such a thing for Thomas Aquinas as secular biblical interpretation, it would differ 
from faithful biblical interpretation at the place where the eyes of faith see God's disposing of 
things. Thus, biblical hermeneutics, as Thomas accounts for it, requires a faith in divine 
providence that he expects only God to work. Furthermore, Thomas's subordination of biblical 
hermeneutics to general providence informs it in the farthest from an anthropocentric way. The 
influence the text may exert on the interpreter's interests and purposes also stands under 
providence. In short, providence names among other things a way in which for Thomas 
interpretation resists human attempts to control it.  
c) Similarly, the influence that an interpreter's interpretation exerts on the way in which his or 
her purposes meet with success or failure stands under providence, too. The interpreter may 
never pursue an interest or purpose as though its success or failure depended alone on his or her 
own efforts. Such an attitude not only might lead to the sort of interpretation that fails to "do 
justice" to a text or that finds itself "untrue" to it; such an attitude also and definitely usurps 
God's place as the One Who employs states of affairs to speak. A recognition of the fact that the 
success or failure or unexpected use of an interpretation lies in God's hands places the interpreter 
under the obligation and grants the interpreter the freedom to do the next right thing in 
interpreting, without turning consequentialist about the result. And if the interpreter desires to 
influence the course of events more than the next right interpretation seems likely to do, a 
recognition of God's providential will reminds him or her that interpretation does not, after all, 
qualify as primary causality. Thomas makes prayer the highest of secondary causes, that is, the 
highest among human efforts.32  
Those who worry about the salubrious or deleterious effects of interpretations will tend, if they 
follow the Enlightenment, to address their worries in hermeneutics. Those who worry about the 
effects of interpretation will tend, if they follow Thomas, to address their worries among other 
places in prayer. Prayer is in fact one of the aids to study and modes of acquiring scientia, along 
with imitation of the holy and the good, that Thomas recommends in a brief letter to a brother.33 
It is therefore to prayer that Thomas would turn the interpreter who seeks to achieve some 
purpose by the most effective means. And the interpreter who prays well, of course, will find that 
prayer also improves the interpretation, most of all, perhaps, by leaving the interests and 
purposes that motivate it changed. 
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